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ABSTRACT: The question of emotion in argumentation has received considerable attention in recent 
years. But there is a tension between the traditional normative role of informal logic, and the 
inclusion of emotion which is viewed as notoriously unstable. Here I argue that that, a] there is 
always emotion in an argument; b] that the presence of emotion is a good thing; and c] that we can 
and ought model and teach the use of emotion in Argumentation Theory. 
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The concepts of ‘‘cognition’’ and ‘‘emotion’’ are, after all, simply 
abstractions for two aspects of one brain in the service of action. 
(Storbeck & Clore, 2007, p. 3) 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
This essay will focus on a question: What is it about emotions that we find so 
frightening? Why do we tremble at the thought of feelings? Why is “being emotional” 
something to avoid, and inimical to “clear-thinking”? Warranted or not, this view is 
old, as witness Shakespeare, “Give me that man that is not passion’s slave, and I will 
wear him in my heart’s core” (Hamlet, Act III, [ODQ] 1955)And, Pope adds, “The 
ruling passion, be what it will, the ruling passion conquers reason still,” To Lord 
Bathurst (ODQ). Burke is more specific in, On the sublime and the Beautiful: “No 
passion so effectually robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear” 
(ODQ). More recently, the well known philosopher, Mr. Spock of the Starship 
Enterprise, states, “May I say that I have not enjoyed serving under Humans. I find 
their illogic and foolish emotions a constant irritant” (Star Trek, 1966). 
 While the Burke quote refers to a negative emotion, it is worth noting that 
the others do not. This raises the question of whether or not positive emotions are 
also to be feared. Can there be too much pleasure? An overabundance of love or joy? 
I want to suggest that our views of emotion do include the caution of too much of 
any emotion, not just the negative ones. Thus, one can be “blinded by love,” and 
“blissfully ignorant,” and so on. It strikes me that the key to all this is a question of 
control, i.e., of self-control. We have the idea that we can control our thoughts, but 
not our emotions, and this makes emotions more frightening than our allegedly pure 
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cognitive processes. Elster points out that some emotions can occur out of our 
control (1999, pp. 28-29), and cites Montaigne as suggesting that anger can 
overcome us before we realize it. In addition, emotions are often involuntary, which 
is another way of our being out of control. 
 There are a number of issues at play here, and I would like to raise several 
with the purpose of understanding our approach to emotions. These issues concern 
the question of control and why we have no fear of losing cognitive control; how 
emotion is essential to decision-making and choice; and, finally, how the 
emotion/reason dichotomy mirrors and supports a feminine/masculine division 
that is, at its heart, patriarchal. 
 
2. A QUESTION OF CONTROL 
 
I want to say first that we do sometimes, most or all of us, lose control or, perhaps, 
come close to that. I know that I certainly do. We may be overcome by emotion and, 
occasionally, act in ways that we would otherwise not or would later regret, as a 
result of our actions. The degree, frequency, and vehemence with which this 
happens will vary greatly from person to person, and from culture to culture. But 
anger, sadness, love, among other feelings, can result in a short circuiting of our 
usual self-censorship and control. This view resonates but is, I suggest, simplistic in 
a number of ways that are worth examining. 
 The first problem with blaming emotions for our outbursts, is that virtually 
all of them are based to one degree or another on beliefs that are a result of a 
straightforward cognitive process. Carl becomes enraged because he believes that 
Alex broke his guitar out of carelessness. David becomes wracked with sobs and 
flooded with tears because he believes that his dog has been killed. Susan commits 
herself to buying a house she cannot possibly afford because Beth has agreed to 
marry her. All these reactions, which we might say are emotionally driven, rely on 
the acceptance of certain beliefs without which they would not occur in the first 
place. David’s belief concerning the demise of his pet may be completely rational, 
relying on evidence and other perfectly straightforward information. Susan’s joy at 
Beth’s acceptance of her marriage proposal is absolutely correct – Beth did, indeed, 
accept. Her overwhelming happiness and her desire to make Beth happy by 
providing her with the house of her dreams leads Susan to throw caution to the 
wind. Each of these incidents involving a loss of control requires a cognitive trigger, 
a grounding without which they would not occur. Someone who, without any reason 
at all, becomes wildly enraged has a mental defect, just as someone who is 
desperately sad without reason does as well, viz., clinical depression. 
 It is important that while we blame emotions, being over-emotional is but 
one way of losing control. A hyper-rationality can also lead to actions that dismay, if 
not the actor, then the observers. It is widely accepted that the Nazi Final Solution 
was a highly organized and rational undertaking, in at least one sense of the word. 
In addition, a multitude of highly intelligent and very rational people believe 
statements such as, {P  (Q  P)}, which is a consequence of logical thinking, and the 
explanation of which requires much mind bending and convoluted rationales. There 
are also extreme cases analogous to depression and psychotic rage, namely, various 
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forms of autism where emotions are not recognized, leading the afflicted into 
actions and situations not to be recommended. As Damasio points out, sociopaths 
who steal, rape and lie are, “…the very picture of the cool head we were told to keep 
in order to do the right thing” (Damasio, 1994, p. 178). 
 It is also worth noting that the kind of reasoning promulgated and honoured 
in Critical Thinking books and classes, is highly unemotional. We abstract from the 
context in order to isolate the premisses and conclusions, and model them in a 
linear fashion. This non-emotional, literal way of proceeding is one of Barbara 
O’Keefe’s method design logics, viz., the expressive MDL, which is considered the 
most unsophisticated method of communication as compared to the conventional 
MDL and the rhetorical MDL (O'Keefe, 1988). In other words, in the real world, 
ignoring emotion puts one at a disadvantage. 
 Notice that we tend to place the extremes of over emotionality and hyper-
rationality in the category of mental illness, (but I do not include informal logicians 
in that category.) So the question becomes, for those us who behave typically, is 
there a separation between emotion and reason? If we are not “out of control,” are 
we always aware of the influences of each? Does not being out of control mean that 
we are in control? 
 I suggest not, and there is evidence to support this. 
 
Overall, positive moods seem to have mixed effects on people’s reasoning. On the 
one hand, they seem to promote greater flexibility and creativity in problem solving, 
which appears logically desirable; on the other hand, they seem to promote a more 
top-down, less data-driven, and less thorough mode of processing, which appears 
logically less desirable. (Pham, 2007, p. 158) 
 
 So, for example, the environment can have an impact on how we reason, and 
even on what beliefs we hold. A nice day replete with sunshine and little birdies 
chirping merrily, can influence our mood, and, ergo, our behaviour. “A basic 
requirement of logical rationality is an accuracy of perceptions and beliefs. A large 
body of evidence indicates that incidental affective states tend to distort people’s 
perceptions and beliefs about objects in an assimilative fashion” (Pham, 159). In my 
work, I take the sense of the term ‘environment’ very broadly, especially as used in 
my visceral mode of communication (Gilbert, 1997). Thus, the setting, power 
relations, gender relations, and what might be considered incidental activities or 
factors all become potentially relevant to the interaction. We are, in fact, well aware 
of this. For that reason we ask for a raise on days off when the boss is in a good 
mood, and we don’t bring up the subject of homework when a child is in the midst of 
a tantrum. We look upon failure to be aware of such markers and failure to take 
them into account as a sign of a lack in either emotional acuity or intelligence.1 
  
 There has been considerable debate over the question of whether cognition 
                                                        
1 I must confess that I am delighted to find that there is empirical evidence for a principle of my 
theory and also of Willard’s. We, along with other rhetorically minded Argumentation Theorists, have 
been arguing that the idea of context, situation, or environment is integral to understanding 
argumentation and, indeed, communication. It is a relief to have some scientific basis for this. 
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precedes emotion, emotion precedes cognition, or whether there is any separation 
between them at all. I want to declare immediately that I am only a spectator in this 
debate, and would not know an amygdale if it was served to me with a béarnaise 
sauce. Nonetheless, the debate is an interesting one. Elster (1999, p. 2), says, “By and 
large, emotions are triggered by beliefs.” I do not have great issues with this, as the 
examples I used above illustrate, but I remark it to underline that, for him, there is a 
discernible difference between emotions and beliefs. Hume, alternatively, takes a 
different view: “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can 
never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” (Hume, 1985, Bk. II 
S. 3). This too, makes sense. The passions, after all, tell us what we like, and reason 
tells us how to achieve it. Compare these to the opening quotation, “The concepts of 
‘cognition’ and ‘emotion’ are, after all, simply abstractions for two aspects of one 
brain in the service of action” (Storbeck & Clore, 2007, p. 1213). 
 How does the priority of either reason or emotion relate to the question of 
control. I have argued that we can lose control via reason or via emotion, and that 
attempting to determine which is prior will likely result in our concluding that they 
are, except in the most abstract sense, completely intertwined and frequently 
indistinguishable. Beliefs can lead to feelings, as when one is taught racist beliefs 
when young, and emotions can underscore those same beliefs. On the other hand, 
emotion may well lead to a rejection of false or doubtful beliefs as one begins to 
become uncomfortable with the way they sit. I have, for example, the strong belief 
that people with free earlobes, as opposed to attached earlobes, are more intelligent, 
honest, hardworking, reliable, creative, and generally more worthy of reward and 
praise. Those with attached lobes tend to the lower classes, are naturally more 
adept at menial labour, and are not worthy of serious education. I would , indeed, be 
very upset were my daughter to marry one. 
 Now the question is, are we dealing here with a cognitive issue, a question of 
beliefs, facts, and knowledge, or something based in emotion? We know that people 
believe the strangest things, and they often feel that their beliefs are correct. 
However, as I have argued elsewhere, (Gilbert, 2011), feelings often the form the 
basis for many beliefs be they spiritual, scientific or mathematical. Consequently, it 
is the mix of both that creates the belief set on which many actions are based, and 
pointing to emotion or cognition as the sole operating factor is just mistaken. 
 
3. THE NECESSITY OF EMOTION 
 
A while ago (Gilbert, 2007) I discussed a question raised by Biro and Siegel (1992) 
regarding how one makes decisions, and how “rational” that process is. Their 
contention is that someone who, using their example, chose a candidate to vote for 
based on the candidate’s looks was obviously wrong and not rational. I called this 
the BS challenge, and I have given it much thought since that time. I want to say, first 
of all, that I truly understand their point. We want citizens to make voting choices 
based on such things as the issues and positions of the several candidates, and not 
on something we would consider frivolous or irrelevant or emotional. The problem I 
have is that the more I think about it, the weaker the BS position is. 
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Consider a reasonably intelligent person attempting to decide between 
candidates in a provincial election. Her riding has the usual four, Liberal, 
Conservative, NDP and Green. Now, on the BS model, she is supposed to carefully 
consider the position of each party on… Well, on what? On everything? On each 
issue from daycare to small business postal subsidies? What about the attitude each 
has toward federal transfer payments as a function of agricultural support? Indeed, 
each of the parties has a huge 600 page book detailing all their positions. We must 
assume, according to BS, that once the election is called, she must spend all her free 
time studying these manifestoes, comparing them, and deciding which party has the 
best stand on each issue. 
 Obviously, our voter, let’s call her Sally, is not and maybe even cannot do this, 
certainly not in the time between parliament being prorogued and election day. Not 
only that, but we don’t expect her to do that, simply because we don’t do that. No one 
who doesn’t have a job requirement to undertake those researches will do it, not 
least because no human being really understands federal/provincial transfer 
payments, and who wants to? Sally will first and foremost, decide which issues she 
cares about. She will then examine the parties on those issues, while perhaps 
keeping an open ear on others. Sally being a young woman who is engaged to be 
married, is very concerned about daycare, EI maternity benefits, and education. Her 
fiancé’s main concerns are job creation programmes and a provincial commitment 
to bringing an NFL team to the province. Neither of them cares about the 
attractiveness of the candidates or, for that matter, their race, religion or sex, though 
Sally would be happier to vote for a woman.  
 What I want to suggest is that these base decisions, these preferences, are 
essentially emotional, and a function of one’s concerns at the time. I very well 
remember being an expectant father, and nothing in the world seemed so pressing 
to me as the issues that touched upon child birth, childcare, education and so on. 
While I still regard them as important, they are not the only ones I take into 
consideration. What remains, however, is that it is virtually impossible to consider 
all the issues, and even if we could, we would still have to rank them in order of 
importance and that, in and of itself, is an emotional process. We always, in short, 
reason with choice, preference and feelings already in play. Regard Damasio when 
discussing the patient Elliot who had pre-frontal damage meaning that his affective 
input was inhibited: “What the experience with patients such as Elliot suggests is 
that the cool strategy advocated by Kant, among others, has far more to do with the 
way patients with prefrontal damage go about deciding than with how normals 
usually operate” (op. cit. 172). I.e., in the ideal, BS, model “reasoning” never stops, 
because the decision cannot be made by reasoning alone; emotional input is 
required to limit the field of choices. This is the issue I raised in (2011). Emotion or 
intuition or feeling is required to avoid infinite regress, simply because we have a 
need to have closure over information and options. 
 
4. WOMEN ARE SO EMOTIONAL 
 
There is another aspect to the emotion/cognition debate that needs mentioning. 
This concerns the role of gender, and the way in which the genders are expected 
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(and frequently do) involve themselves with emotion and cognition. If we reflect 
back to the question I opened with, why is emotion so scary, we really have to step 
back and ask, scary to whom? The cultural mythology is that emotions are scarier to 
men than to women, and, according to the research in social psychology that's not 
really far off. But we should be more precise: people with certain characteristics 
traditionally labelled as feminine tend to be more comfortable with being around and 
with expressing emotions than those who lack those characteristics. This is more 
precise because it does not divide the world into two neat boxes of “Woman” and 
“Man.” Rather, it identifies certain traits or characteristics that are not directly 
correlated to either sex or gender. “For example,” Brody writes, “when men engage 
in child care, their emotional expressiveness resembles what we stereotypically 
associate with women. Men who take primary responsibility for raising their 
children express more nurturance, affection, and disclose more feelings than men 
who do not” (Brody, 1997, p. 376). Thus, using Spence’s (Spence & Buckner, 2000) 
multi-dimensional traits analysis, it is not males but masculinity that abhors 
emotion. Of course, femininity is generally found in greater abundance in women 
than in men, and as many have argued, that is a function of socialization, power 
relations, and social role (Brody, 1997,  passim), rather than biological factors. 
 If we now return to our original question, “why are we so afraid of emotion?” 
we need to make an adjustment to the term ‘we.’ Because, it turns out that the ‘we’ 
does not really include everyone, but, rather it includes predominately those with 
masculine characteristics, viz., men, and not only men, but men with minimal 
feminine aspects. The result of this is a decided favouristism toward so-called 
“rational” procedures, what I have identified as the “logical” mode of communication 
(Gilbert, 1997), which results, in turn, in a major Component of what is call The 
Patriarchy. The patriarchy works by excluding those who rely on, utilize, respond to, 
or otherwise have sympathy for emotional communication and argument. This is 
not the sole tool of the patriarchy, but it is a major one. It excludes many, and for 
many reasons (Rooney, 2010; Campbell, 1994; Jaggar, 1989). It should also be noted 
in passing that it is not only women who are excluded, but numerous cultural 
groups as well are silenced by not being able to play the logic game according to 
rules they may not even know, let alone understand (Reygadas, 2001).  
 The process is very simple. Men are conditioned not to show any emotion 
other than anger, while women are taught that demonstrating emotion is good.  
 In Western cultures women are believed to be more emotionally expressive 
in general than are men. Specifically, they are expected to smile more as well as to 
show more sadness, fear, and guilt. In contrast, men are believed to show more 
overt emotional displays only in terms of physically aggressive anger. (Hess et al., 
2000, p. 610) 
 Of course, expressing emotion is not the same as experiencing emotion. The 
gender differences there are much less marked (Kring & Gordon, 1998). 
Nonetheless, the insistence on eliminating and isolating emotions precludes those 
women who have not trained themselves in at least the show of masculine traits 
from being taken seriously (Burrow, 2005). This is sexist and morally unacceptable, 
and provides a significant reason for why we need to adjust our criteria for 
reasonableness, as well as distinguishing the logical from the rational. 




The problem with modelling things that aren’t separate is that we invariably forget 
we’re modelling. That is, we make a distinction for theoretical purposes, describe 
the paradigmatic cases we identify in order to attain a deeper understanding of the 
concepts, and then promptly forget they are concepts, and treat them like 
independent objects. Subsequently, we find ourselves in philosophical difficulties, 
and have to prove the two things are not separate, which is what we stipulated in 
the first place and then forgot. There are many examples of this including 
mind/brain, female/male, public/private, and, par excellence, emotion/reason.  
 The issue here, and one that has haunted philosophy through the ages, 
concerns the reintegrating of emotion and reason, or, to use my language, the re-
baptizing of emotional argument and emotional decision-making as rational. I have 
argued that the bogeyman is not emotion, but loss of control, and that reason can be 
out of control as well. Certainly, we can lose control of our emotions, but that 
occurrence invariably involves cognitive considerations. In addition, our reason can 
lead us into dreadful situations as a result of beliefs we hold and the consequences 
that follow from them. With apologies to Churchill, we might conclude by saying that 
we have nothing to fear but ourselves. 
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